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The purpose of this research is to validate the systems
model of insurgency and counterinsurgency by examining two
case studies in counterinsurgency; the Emergency in Malaya
from 1948-1960 and the ongoing war in El Salvador. One of
these case studies proved to be a success, and one thus far
has proved to be a failure. The paper's proposition is that
successful counterinsurgency, as in Malaya, requires that the
government view the insurgency as a "system" and attack each
of the insurgency's components (inputs, conversion process,
and outputs) . Conversely, unsuccessful cases of
counterinsurgency, such as in El Salvador, are those in which
the government focuses exclusively on outputs. This study will
attempt to validate this proposition by analyzing the
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I . INTRODUCTION
Since World War II and the development of nuclear
deterrence, the United States has been successful in averting
major war. Yet, while deterrence has worked at the upper end
of the conflict spectrum, war and the resort to force at the
lower end of the spectrum has not been deterred. Low intensity-
conflict is the most prevalent kind of war since 1945. This is
especially true of one aspect of low intensity conflict,
insurgency or internal war. As one observer has noted, "Of the
125 to 150 conflicts that have taken place in the past four
decades, 90 percent occurred in developing regions and are
best characterized by internal war." (Sereseres, 1985, p. 161)
Nor is the situation liable to change in the future. The human
and societal conditions that give rise to insurgency are
likely to persist in many parts of the Third World. In
addition, new pressures created by the end of the Cold War may
generate new insurgencies in unexpected places.
For forty years, the Cold War not only held some nations
together by force, it also enabled many weak states to survive
far longer than they might have otherwise. With the end of the
Cold War, what may become increasingly common are challenges
to states from within--from ethnic, tribal, and religious
groups dissatisfied with the shape or the content of their
nations and ready to use force to bring about change. These
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groups are likely to resort to insurgency as a means of
redefining their nations.
Such insurgencies can pose a challenge to the United
States and its allies in several ways: as a political and
economic threat to U.S. regional allies, as a direct threat to
U.S. citizens, facilities and business operations in foreign
lands, and through the potential creation of new regimes
hostile to the interests of the United States or its local
allies (Hosmer, 1990, p. 5). Because of the continuing
challenge posed by insurgent organizations in the Third World,
the United States must be prepared to support friendly
governments facing such a threat. A central feature of such
support must involve counterinsurgent strategic planning. This
study is an effort to elaborate and explain one method by
which a local counterinsurgency campaign might be carried out.
Through an examination of the counterinsurgent campaigns in
Malaya and El Salvador, it will provide a framework for
counterinsurgent (COIN) forces to target an advanced
insurgency.
For governments facing the threat of insurgency, a COIN
strategy is often mistaken for a national strategy. The
national strategy must address the fundamental grievances
which are the social and economic roots of "people's wars."
This must be accomplished through a unified strategy to
enhance regime legitimacy, national economic growth, and
internal security. Subordinated to this national plan is the
counterinsurgent strategy, which is the military plan of
action to counter the armed threat posed by the insurgent
organization. This paper addresses only the military dimension
of the larger national campaign. It presents a specific
operational concept for defeating a guerrilla threat known as
the "systems approach" to counterinsurgency . When applied to
an insurgency, the model "illuminates the target" for COIN
forces, giving form to and flushing out an enemy that must
remain invisible to survive.
A. THE SYSTEMS MODEL OF INSURGENCY
The systems model of insurgency was developed by two RAND
analysts, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., in their book
Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent
Conflicts . The model views an insurgency as a "system"
composed of three parts: inputs, a conversion mechanism, and
outputs. To view an insurgent movement as a system is to
emphasize the factors within the insurgent organization that
influence its capabilities and growth. As the authors
indicate
:
the central question. .. [the rebellion's] operations: how
[the rebellion] obtains its supplies; what forms of
coercion and persuasion are used to influence the




[The] inside of [the rebellion] is what needs
to be studied. (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 40)
The system's view of insurgency holds that for an
insurgent organization to function, it must, like any other
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organization, obtain certain inputs from either internal or
external sources and then convert them into outputs or
activities. Inputs into the insurgent system are the raw
materials needed to make the insurgent machine operate. The
principal, though not exclusive source of these inputs is the
population, or more precisely-, the covert insurgent
infrastructure operating among the population. This
infrastructure provides the insurgent with the manpower for
his units, the food, medicine and shelter to support him, and
the intelligence on government forces necessary for his
safety. It also acts as the "shadow government" in the
village, contesting the authority of the government and
supplanting it when possible. In short, the insurgent
infrastructure provides the inputs necessary to make the
guerrilla organization work. To be sure, certain crucial
resources--f inancing, initial training, cadres, and
organizational counsel—may be provided by external sources.
As the authors point out, "the mix between endogeny and
exogeny is variable: it differs between different
[rebellions], and in the same [rebellion] at different times."
(Leites and Wolf, p. 33)
The inputs, once acquired, are then converted into outputs
through a conversion process. As with any organization, the
insurgent organization is likely to be broken out into
component parts, each responsible for a different
organizational function, e.g. ideological indoctrination,
training, logistics, communications, intelligence, etc. Young
peasants must be taught how to operate as combatants and
indoctrinated in the guerrilla ideology; a logistics system
must be organized to provide the necessary supplies to the
insurgency throughout its operational areas; a communications
network linking the leadership with the rank and file must be
established. The guerrilla organization's ability to manage
these and related functions will play a crucial role in
determining the success of the insurgency.
At the third level of the model are the outputs or
activities of the insurgency. These include the overt military
acts of the insurgents, such as sabotage, ambushes, and
attacks on army posts, as well as the guerrilla's political
outputs (the exercise of authority in areas controlled or
contested by the insurgents and its ability to monitor and
manage the population under its control). Political and
military outputs are designed to increase the level of
insurgent authority in the eyes of the population while
decreasing the authority and legitimacy of the government.
Additionally, successful operations will generate new inputs
as weapons are captured, base areas are established and the
movement garners new supporters from the population. A diagram
of insurgency as a system appears in Figure 1.
B. THE COUNTERINSURGENT TASKS
Operationally, the systems model suggests four different
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Figure 1. Insurgency as a System (Leites and Wolf, p. 35)
insurgent organization and degrading its ability to obtain
inputs and produce outputs. The tasks involve "intervention by
the government at different phases in the insurgent system -
that is, moving successively down the diagram of insurgent
operations." (Leites and Wolf, p. 75)
The first responsibility is to control and diminish the
supply of inputs to the insurgency. Since the principal source
of inputs to the insurgent system comes from the people (Mao's
"fish and water"), the insurgents must be cut off from their
sources of supplies. This involves measures to control and
defend the population so that the guerrilla infrastructure
operating among the population can be isolated and attacked.
The campaign against the insurgent infrastructure is the
crucial task for COIN forces and its importance cannot be
overstated. As Sir Robert Thompson, one of the most prominent
authorities on guerrilla warfare writes:
Unless the communist subversive political organization in
the towns and villages is broken and eliminated, the
insurgent guerrilla units will not be defeated. If the
guerrillas can be isolated from the population... then
their eventual destruction becomes automatic. (Thompson,
1966, p. 56)
Another renowned student and practitioner of insurgent
warfare, Roger Trinquier, is in complete agreement:
...in modern warfare we are not just up against a few
armed bands... but rather against an armed clandestine
organization whose essential role is to impose its will on
the population. Victory will be obtained only through the
complete destruction of that organization. (Trinquier,
1961, p. 8-9)
By attacking the guerrilla organization, the government is
targeting the heart of the insurgent system. As this
organization is eliminated, the guerrillas, being short of
supplies, recruits, and intelligence, will be forced to stand
and fight (on government force terms) simply to remain intact.
The second task of COIN forces is to reduce the
insurgent's efficiency in converting acquired inputs into
outputs of the insurgent system. This is done by reducing the
productivity of insurgent resources, as well as by forcing the
guerrillas to divert resources from producing offensive
operations to more defensive measures. Efforts aimed at this
process include:
...creating distrust and frictions within [the
rebellion's] organization by planting rumors; attracting
defectors (particularly those from the higher ranks in
[the rebellion's] civil and military organization);
disseminating credible misinformation about the behavior
of [the rebellion's] leadership; and generally raising the
noise level in [the rebellion's] information system.
(Leites and Wolf, p. 36)
Such measures can be augmented by efforts to target the
insurgent leadership. The comandantes are high value targets
for two reasons. First, because of their command abilities
and activities as the guerrilla's "brain trust," leaders are
more difficult to replace than the rank and file. Secondly, in
many peoples' eyes, they are the "heart and soul" of the
insurgency, and as such once eliminated cannot be replaced.
The death or capture of middle and high level leaders would
signal the demise of the insurgency to the population and
would show that the government is the winning side.
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The third responsibility consists of hardening the
government's mechanisms of social control, or increasing the
government's capacity to absorb insurgent outputs. This is
done in two ways. In the political realm, the government must
show that it is capable of governing. As the authors describe:
...effective politics requires that [authority]
demonstrate a growing capacity to govern- -by adhering to
and enforcing law and order; by maintaining discipline
within and between its agencies; and by completing
announced programs visibly and expeditiously (Leites and
Wolf, p. 73) .
The other aspect of hardening involves the beefing up of local
defense capabilities and/or fortifying village areas against
insurgent attack.
The final task for COIN forces is to target the insurgent
forces [outputs] directly - counterforce . As the authors point
out, the kinds of force in COIN differ from those required to
meet conventional threats:
...to apply force effectively in insurgent conflicts, it
[the government] must have capabilities much closer to
[the rebellion's] than to the capability of conventional
forces. Mobility, reconnaissance, small units... police
and paramilitary forces are the important military
elements for deterring or meeting the threat of
[rebellion] --not armor, artillery, jet aircraft and large
centralized operations.... (Leites and Wolf, p. 153-154)
The defending regime, however, must ensure that it does
not adopt a strategy which focuses only on outputs.
Unfortunately, because counterforce operations are "the
traditional military task and the one best understood, most
familiar, and typically preferred by the military, " (Leites
and Wolf, p. 81) it often becomes the primary COIN strategy of
a government confronting an insurgency. This is a mistake, due
to the differences between conventional and insurgent warfare.
In conventional war this is the proper strategy; once enough
of the enemy's forces are attrited his territory can be
occupied and eventually he will sue for peace. But in an
insurgency this calculus does not apply. A counterforce
strategy will rarely be debilitating to an insurgency, as
Krepinevich explains:
First, the insurgents have no need to engage the
government forces-they are not fighting to hold territory.
Second, as long as government forces are out seeking
battle with the guerrilla units, the insurgents are not
forced to fight to maintain access to the people.
Therefore, the initiative remains with the guerrillas --
they can "set" their own level of casualties ... thus
rendering ineffective all efforts by the counterinsurgent
forces to win a traditional military victory.
(Krepinevich, 1986, p. 11)
Rather than designating guerrilla forces as the primary
target, the population that supports the guerrillas and the
inputs it receives should be the focus of a counterinsurgency
.
This is precisely the counsel of the systems model, as Leites
and Wolf explain:
...[the authority's] aim should be to attack [the
rebellion's] organization, that is, to attack the apparatus
by which the forces and outputs of the system are produced.
(Leites and Wolf, p. 84) [the rebellion's] armed forces are
not unimportant for [the authority's] targeting, but they
are less important than [the rebellion's] organization and
logistics network in reducing [the rebellion's]
effectiveness. (Leites and Wolf, p. 78)
As the model makes clear, insurgent outputs are only one
third of the insurgent system. A COIN effort that focuses on
outputs alone [counterforce strategy] is addressing only a
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fraction of the insurgency. Such a strategy is condemned to
fight the insurgency at the margin, and is unlikely to
directly defeat an enemy engaged in revolutionary guerrilla
warfare. Moreover the counterinsurgent forces, under these
circumstances, are forced to adopt a reactive posture, thus
ceding the initiative to the insurgents. The critical
components of the insurgent system for COIN forces are the
inputs it receives and the apparatus by which insurgent
activities are supported and generated. Rather than attempting
to destroy guerrilla forces, the emphasis is placed on
attacking the guerrilla organization and how it obtains and
manages inputs from the population. This will have an
indirect, but ultimately decisive impact on outputs. By
directing the counterinsurgent effort at the guerrilla
organization, or infrastructure, the insurgent is cut off from
the support of the people, and it is the people who fulfill
the central role of providing him with the manpower for his
units, the food, medicine and shelter to support him, and the
intelligence on government forces necessary for his safety. As
Thompson notes:
The mere killing of insurgents, without the simultaneous
destruction of their infrastructure, is a waste of effort
because. . .all casualties will be made good by new recruits.
(Thompson, p. 116)
In sum, the model suggests that waging a successful
counterinsurgency campaign requires that primary attention be
devoted to the counterproduction effort rather than the
counterforce effort. The objective should be to attack the
11
apparatus by which forces and outputs of the system are
produced.
C. CRITICISMS OF THE MODEL
Some observers have criticized the systems model of
insurgency, calling it "immoral, based on a strategy of
coercion." (Shafer, 1988, p. 127-132) These criticisms are
based on Leites and Wolf's discussion of coercion as an
instrument used by both government and insurgents to control
the population. Leites and Wolf do examine the uses of
coercion, but they do not advocate it. They merely identify it
as one of the tools available for use to both sides. As
Chalmers Johnson rightly concludes:
. . .although [Leites and Wolf] do not specifically advocate
it... a reader .. .might get the idea from their work that
counterinsurgency is most effective when understood as a
process of raising the costs to the peasantry of
supporting the guerrillas. (Johnson, 1973, p. 42)
Most importantly, such criticism wrongly suggests that
coercion is somehow integral to the systems model of
insurgency. These analyses fail to recognize the two distinct
discussions by Leites and Wolf, one on coercion, the other
concerning the model itself. As the following chapters will
make clear, the systems model provides a way to defeat an
insurgency by attacking the guerrilla organization, not
coercing the population. Moreover, a strategy targeted against
the infrastructure reduces collateral damage because it relies
on discriminate force to neutralize the enemy, not the massive
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firepower of conventional operations which invariably
generates high civilian casualties.
D. MODEL APPLIED TO MALAYA
Interpreting the British campaign in Malaya using the
model, we find that the British attacked inputs in the
following ways: they separated the guerrillas from the
population through a resettlement program which provided
security and rural development to those preyed upon by the
insurgents; they registered the population through
identification cards and travel permits which made it
difficult for guerrillas to move freely in the rural areas;
they instituted food control and food denial measures which
prevented food from getting to the insurgents.
In attacking the conversion process, the British launched
a psychological warfare campaign using leaflets, radio
announcements, and "voice aircraft" to reduce the moral of the
guerrilla ranks and increase internal conflicts within the
insurgent organization. A rewards for surrender program
neutralized a large number of guerrillas and also provided a
steady flow of intelligence on the insurgency. The government
also attacked the conversion process directly with aerial
spraying of the insurgent jungle gardens.
The British hardened the government against the insurgents
through the creation and expansion of local militia to guard
the new settlements. The militia augmented the army units and
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served as the barrier between the insurgents and the
population. The new settlements provided a venue for
successful development assistance which touched the lives of
many who previously existed outside the reach of the
government
.
And finally, the COIN forces attacked outputs using small
unit operations. But even here, input denial became the chief
basis for counterforce operations. Using these tactics, the
government defeated the communist insurgents in Malaya. Ever
since, the British experience has been lauded as a model of
successful counterinsurgency . As the Malayan case illustrates,
successful tactics in insurgent conflicts are aimed at
counterproduction: to impair the ability of the rebellion to
produce and reproduce forces. "The organization of the
insurgents and its interface with the population is the
crucial target for the government's military and political
efforts--not the insurgent forces themselves, or the transient
territorial base from which they operate." (Leites and Wolf,
p. 154)
E. MODEL APPLIED TO EL SALVADOR
The COIN campaign in El Salvador was much different. We
find that the government did not attack the entire insurgent
system. Instead, the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) began
with a counterforce strategy against the insurgents and
retained it, despite the insurgent's shift in tactics to
guerrilla revolutionary war in 1985. Attempts were made to
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attack the insurgency as a system, but they failed due to ESAF
neglect and a preoccupation with the counterforce effort. The
ESAF never fully accepted the attempt to control inputs
through civil defense, and it failed due to a lack of
attention, resources, and support. Refugees and displaced
persons were ignored and became a key source of insurgent
support both in El Salvador and across the border in Honduras.
The critical issue of external support to the insurgency
[exogeny] was never a priority for the ESAF. This is
demonstrated by the low priority given to the two services
charged with interdicting external supplies, the navy and
customs service. Attempts to harden the government and provide
services to the population through civic action have
floundered, due to ESAF failure to provide security to the
population. The result is a costly stalemate in a protracted
war.
In the following sections we will apply the systems model
to the counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and El Salvador.
In Chapter 2, an examination of the Malayan case will reveal
that the British were successful because they did exactly what
the model prescribes: a COIN campaign concentrated on denying
inputs and attacking the organization of the insurgency. In
Chapter 3, we will see how the ESAF has failed to defeat the
insurgency because of an output oriented strategy which
neglected to include an assault on guerrilla inputs and
infrastructure. Chapter 4 will compare and contrast the cases,
15
bringing out differences and identifying areas for further
research.
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II. THE MALAYAN INSURGENCY
Communism came to Malaya in the 192 0s when Party-
organizers from Indonesia arrived, following Moscow's orders
to penetrate the West's colonial territories. The Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) was founded in 1931 and was made up by
the ethnic Chinese community who did not benefit from British
colonial rule.
When Japan invaded Malaya in February 1942, the Chinese
Communists seized the opportunity to become the chief
organization of nationalist resistance. The Party withdrew
into the jungle and organized a guerrilla movement. Since it
was the only organized force in opposition to the Japanese,
the British armed and trained the MCP during the war. The 5000
man Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) conducted
harassing activities behind Japanese lines during World War
II.
By the end of the war, almost all possible political
opposition had been removed by the MCP, and a powerful force
had been trained and organized in guerrilla operations. The
MCP emerged from the jungle as victors and were received as
such by the population. Prevented by the returning British
forces from gaining a military hold on the peninsula, the
Party was permitted to operate and became a recognized force
with the ability to organize front groups and dominate the
trade union movement. Using its union power, the MCP fomented
labor agitation and strikes to bring down the government. In
17
1947 there were 291 strikes, involving 69,000 men and the loss
of nearly 700,000 man-days . In May 1948 alone, the number of
man-days lost rose to 178,500 (Komer, 1972, p. 5). The British
countered by placing controls on MCP activity, arresting and
deporting key leaders, and encouraging union development
outside of Communist control.
In the spring of 1948, following a period of labor unrest,
demonstrations, and sabotage, the MCP retreated into the
jungle and began to mount armed attacks against the
government. The MPAJA reactivated its former members, signed
on new recruits, and uncovered its weapons caches established
during the war against Japan. This new army, now called the
Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA) , found a ready source of
food, recruits, and information among the Chinese communities.
It established a political and logistics organization among
the rural Chinese villages known as the Min Yuen , or Mass
Organization, which would provide logistics support to the
combat forces in the jungle. On June 19, 1948 the Federation
declared a state of emergency. The British and Malayan
governments ultimately mobilized a total of 40,000 regular
troops, 60,000 police, and about a quarter of a million Home
Guards, who were responsible for village defense. MRLA
strength ranged from 8000 at the height of the Emergency to an
inconsequential number by the war's end in 1960. The Min Yuen
numbered about 40,000.
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Malaya at the time of the Emergency
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During the first two years of the war, the British relied
on conventional military measures to put down the rebellion.
Triple canopy jungle and a 6,000 foot mountain range down the
backbone of the country made movement very difficult. It took
some crack British battalions from three to six months of
combing operations before they were able to report any
guerrilla casualties or prisoners. It was clear that a
conventional offensive strategy was simply not suited to an
elusive jungle foe who was committed to protracted war.
A. APPLYING THE SYSTEMS MODEL
By early 1950, the British had recognized that they were
making little or no headway against the MRLA. They were
beginning to see that the key to success was to isolate the
guerrilla force from the population by attacking its inputs
and logistics organization. The Briggs Plan, named after
General Sir Harold Briggs, the first director of Operations in
Malaya, was put into operation in 1951. Its aim was fourfold:
to dominate the populated areas and create a feeling of
security among the population that would result in increased
intelligence on the insurgents; to break up the communist
organization within the populated areas; to isolate the
guerrillas from their supply organization in the populated
areas; and to destroy the guerrilla force by making them
attack the security forces on terrain of their choosing. The
20
Briggs plan was a strategy based on counterproduction, not
counterforce
.
In the terminology of the systems model, the Briggs
strategy was aimed at the inputs to the MRLA (populated areas,
food and supplies) and its conversion mechanism
(organization) . In practice, this policy was aimed at inputs
through the resettlement of the population providing support
to the insurgents, the registration of the population to
separate law abider from law breaker, and the control of food
that forced the MRLA to expose itself to government forces.
Likewise, the government targeted the conversion mechanism of
the guerrilla force through psychological campaigns that
sought to induce the insurgent to surrender and crop spraying,
which targeted the production mechanism directly. This
strategy resulted in the defeat of the communist insurgents.
The British experience is heralded as a model of a successful
counterinsurgency campaign.
1. Attacking Insurgent Inputs and Infrastructure
As the systems model suggests, one of the primary
tasks of government forces should be the denial of inputs to
the insurgency. This means the control of domestic resources
and population. Chief among the measures taken by the British
was resettlement of those people offering sympathy and support
to the guerrillas. The fundamental aim of the resettlement
program was to isolate the insurgent both physically and
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politically from the population which housed the organization
and infrastructure so vital to the guerrillas' existence,
a. The Squatters
The primary target of the resettlement program was
the rural Chinese squatters who accounted for about ten
percent of the Malayan population. They were referred to as
squatters because they were often illegal occupants of the
land. This jungle-fringe community was primarily the result of
two causes: the cyclic economic downturns in Malaya which
forced unemployed laborers to leave the city and eke out a
subsistence living; and the exodus from the cities of those
seeking to escape Japanese persecution during the occupation
of World War II. The villages grew up where the people could
find a plot of land to grow food. It was upon this pool of
rural Chinese that the guerrillas relied for much of their
support
.
Quite obviously, not everyone in these villages
was a guerrilla supporter. As one observer has noted, "It is
a great guerrilla warfare fallacy that there are great numbers
eager to drop what they are doing and join the guerrillas to
fight for the cause." (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 81) In Malaya,
the guerrilla infrastructure in the villages was embodied in
the Min Yuen , or "Mass Organization." A Min Yuen member was
typically a resident of the squatter village recruited by the
MCP. Together with other members, they provided the MRLA units
in the field with food, money, intelligence, and recruits, the
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inputs the guerrilla system needed to operate. They also
provided communications for the separated MRLA units through
a system of jungle mailboxes. Min Yuen cells operated within
the villages, moving among the people, organizing opposition
to the government. They were made up by both full-time and
part-time cadre. Many were issued arms and became the MRLA's
auxiliary fighting units. Estimates vary, but it is generally
believed that there were 30,000-40,000 Min Yuen in the early
part of the insurgency. In short, the Min Yuen was the
"parallel hierarchy" in the village, contesting the authority
of the government and supplanting it when possible. As long as
this subversive infrastructure remained in place, the
insurgents could move freely in and out of the village and
convert, if not compel, other civilians to their cause. In the
spring of 1950, the British were losing because they could not
control the source of guerrilla inputs--the squatters
(Clutterbuck, p. 55).
It was this infrastructure that the government
sought to destroy. The decision to resettle the Chinese
squatters struck at the primary source of inputs to the
insurgency. As we have seen, the MRLA's logistics and support
organizations were operating from these villages. By divorcing
the guerrilla from the structure that provided him with food,
information, recruits, and material, the government robbed him
of his support base and made him fight to regain it.
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Resettlement would become the most effective program of the
war.
The resettlement task involved about 423,000
squatters. The "New Villages" were surrounded by fences with
controlled access and were located in defensible positions
near where people worked. Village defense units were formed to
monitor the settlements and defend them against insurgent
attack. Schools, dispensaries, markets, electric lights, and
other facilities were provided. (Komer, p. 55) Once the
infrastructure of the village was completed, the people were
ready to move in.
The round up and movement of the squatters was a
large military operation that required stealth and secrecy.
"Usually the squatter camp was surrounded before dawn by
police and army units, who then moved in to remove the people,
their goods and livestock by truck. In the screening process
the police invariably discovered and arrested wanted
communists and terrorists. The government paid compensation
for any loss suffered in the move . " (O' Ballance, 1966, p. 110)
The resettlement effort was not, however, without
problems. Because the authorities were mostly concerned with
security, some of the village sites lacked accessible water
and arable land for the farmers. There was also an initial
shortage of qualified staff to administer the villages. The
most important problem facing the resettled population was the
disruption to their livelihood. Compensation for the loss of
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crops and livestock was often paid late. In addition, some
farmers did not receive land that was equivalent in size to
their previous plots. The government responded to the problems
with improvements to the basic services in the New Villages.
Spending on education, which the Chinese value greatly, was
increased, as was spending on health services, infant welfare
centers, and dispensaries. The upheaval of relocation was also
mitigated by the Korean War boom.
The government received an unexpected boost
following the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950. The
war increased demand worldwide for many raw materials. Prices
for the two pillars of the Malayan economy- -rubber and tin-
were catapulted to record heights. Export duties on these
primary products, along with increased revenues from
individual and company taxes filled the government's coffers.
In 1950, the estimate for total revenue was put at $273.7
million; the sum actually received was $443.4 million.
Similarly, the estimate for 1951 was $410.3 million while the
sum actually received was $735.4 million (Stubbs, 1989, p.
109) . The government put this unexpected money to work
fighting the insurgency through increased funding for the
police force, the resettlement program, and health and
education programs. Direct expenditures on Emergency
operations went from $82 million in 1949 to $101 million in
1950 and to $217 million in 1951 (Stubbs, p. 109).
25
The economic boom did not benefit the government
alone, it aided all Malayans. The expansion of the rubber and
tin industries meant labor was in great demand, and wages rose
spectacularly. Even the wages of an unskilled field worker
increased from $1.43 per day in the first quarter of 1950 to
a record high of $2.90 per day in the second quarter of 1951
(Stubbs, p. 110) . The new prosperity also tended to distract
the people's attention away from the insurgents' cause. Too
many rubber tappers, complained one MCP propaganda pamphlet,
were spending their money in cinemas, and drinking and
gambling, and participating in other forms of the corrupt life
of capitalism (Stubbs, p. 110)
.
The resettlement program drove a wedge between the
population and the logistical organization of the guerrillas.
A boundary line was established which, over time, would cut
off the guerrillas from their main source of supplies and
information. The insurgents recognized the danger of the
resettlement scheme and reacted violently against it. Villages
were attacked and policemen, government collaborators, and
resettlement officers were murdered. But a growing segment of
the population was becoming disenchanted with the guerrillas.
For the first time, the government was protecting the people.
For many former squatters, the New Villages meant local
development and a chance to integrate into a growing economy.
Therefore, they had a vested interest in the future of the
government. By 1951, the MRLA acknowledged that they were not
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winning the support of the people through intimidation. In
October the guerrilla leadership issued a directive ordering
that while attacks on government officials, police posts and
active collaborators would continue, the guerrillas were,
under no circumstances, to attack innocent people, either at
work or in the villages (Clutterbuck, p. 63). Following the
announcement, guerrilla attacks fell off by more than fifty
percent. Moreover, their inability to propagandize and
intimidate the people left them isolated and dependent upon
their own resources. The isolation was increased using the
food control program initiated by the government,
b. Food Control
As the resettlement progressed, the British
implemented a program designed to deny the insurgent another
key input, food. The food control and food denial operations,
begun in June 1951, were designed to deprive the MRLA of its
sources of food and other essentials such as clothing and
medicine. Curfews restricted the legal use of roads to
daylight hours, road and rail traffic were subject to
inspection, and there were spot checks. Fines and jail terms
were meted out to those who were caught transporting food
without a permit. Village shopkeepers had to account for all
stocks and sales, cans of food were punctured at the time of
sale to ensure their immediate consumption, and sales could
only be made to people with ID cards. In addition, the New
Villagers were subject to a body search every time they left
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the village. Some food was smuggled out in bicycle frames,
false bottoms in buckets and in clothing. But the inspections
gradually improved and interdicted valuable food destined for
the guerrillas.
The controls program was slow to affect the
insurgents. They had hidden stocks and caches of food and some
un-relocated squatters could still be relied on to provide a
little rice. But as the resettlement program progressed and
food control was more strictly enforced, the MRLA began to
feel the pinch.
Moreover, while there remained individuals willing
to help the communists and risk being caught because of their
family or friendship ties, personal grievances, or
intimidation, the system of food control gave others an excuse
for not siding with the guerrillas (Stubbs, p. 167). Because
the people were now living in the New Villages guarded by the
village defense force, they were generally protected from
reprisals
.
c . Food Denial
Areas under heavy guerrilla influence became the
focus of concentrated programs known as Operation Starvation.
The purpose of food denial operations was to destroy a
specific guerrilla target by completely interrupting its
supplies so that the guerrilla force, weakened by hunger, was




Food denial operations were normally mounted in
three phases. Phase one was usually a one to three month
intelligence buildup on the designated area. In phase two, the
operation itself began with an intensification of food control
and pressure from the Security Forces. Phase three was
designed to exploit the insurgents' loss of morale and the
increased flow of intelligence produced by ambushes conducted
by the Security Forces, patrols, and attacks on insurgent
camps. (Short, 1975, p. 376)
These types of operations directly attacked the
inputs of the insurgent system. The MRLA could live off of
hidden food for a while, but eventually these supplies ran out
and the guerrillas could not exist without the support of the
Min Yuen . However, through tight control of food supplies, the
timid or reluctant supplier was given an excuse for not
providing anything to the guerrillas. Thus, the hardcore
supporters were forced to take greater risks (more frequent
trips carrying rice which established patterns of movement).
As a result, they were more likely to be spotted by the
Security Forces. Once captured, a number of the Min Yuen could
be convinced to "turn" and provide information on the shadow
government in the village and information about guerrilla
rendezvous points, camps and operating patterns. This
information was needed to root out the insurgent base. Armed
with this intelligence, village police could arrest or ambush
other cadre. These operations generated significant
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intelligence on the guerrilla organization, which enabled
government forces to identify and neutralize the guerrillas.
Intelligence created by the food denial operations
also helped government forces to target and destroy the MRLA
through the creation of killing grounds. Guerrillas were
discouraged from operating outside these zones by tight food
control and saturation patrolling. Conversely, inside these
zones, food controls were relaxed and patrols kept out.
Guerrillas would thus move freely and contact their suppliers,
including the ones who had secretly betrayed them. This would
lead to refined targeting information for ambushes and other
small unit operations. The impact on the insurgent
infrastructure and combat capability was devastating.
According to Lucian Pye
:
approximately three out of every five people under the
party's control have had to devote all their time and
energies to the logistical problem, and increasingly in
many areas all the people have had to concentrate on
getting supplies. (Leites and Wolf, p. 77)
Edgar O'Ballance also noted:
Its [MRLA] personnel were estimated to be spending nine-
tenths of their time and energy obtaining food. To get
food, the insurgents were force to take more risks, and in
the process exposed themselves to the Security Forces,
thus suffering correspondingly more casualties, (p. 137)
Ambushes based on such intelligence eventually
destroyed the armed guerrilla units in the jungle. This had a
profound effect on the people, as Clutterbuck recounts the
scene after one successful operation:
. . . the police had laid down the five bodies outside the
police post. The people filed past. As they counted the
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bodies and recognized their faces, their attitudes
changed. Every guerrilla was dead, and the threat was gone
- and they knew which was the winning side. They began to
talk freely, and all that remained of the Masses
organization was quickly rounded up. (Clutterbuck, 1973,
p. 250)
d. Registration
Another key measure instituted by the government
was the establishment of national registration and the issue
of identity cards to everyone over the age of 12. By March
1949, some form of ID card had been issued to everyone
registered, some 3,220,000 (Komer, p. 34). Citizens had an
incentive to keep and protect the card, for they needed it to
buy food, find space in a resettled village, or to obtain a
grant to build a house. Frequent police identity checks, in
which the village was cordoned off and everyone scrutinized,
identified people not residing in the village. Also, any
absences were noted for subsequent investigation. In this way,
the government separated the guerrillas from the people and
impeded the Min Yuen'
s
ability to operate within the village.
Known guerrillas and overt members of the guerrilla
organization (MCP hierarchy) were forced out of the towns and
into the jungle. The guerrillas tried to disrupt the system,
but the government thwarted these attempts.
Registration also worked at a more subtle level.
It created a bond between the government and the law abiding
citizen, in that the former was made aware that it had a
responsibility to all carded citizens. The citizen, living in
one of the New Villages and carrying an ID card, was made
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aware of the presence of the government. For many of the
former squatters, this was the first time they were included
among those who were governed and protected by the state.
2. Attacking the Conversion Process
Related to the task of reducing inputs to the
insurgent system is that of impeding the way the insurgent
organization converts inputs into outputs. As discussed in
Chapter 1, conversion can be divided into two subtasks
:
forcing the guerrilla organization to divert resources from
offensive operations to self-sustaining activities; and
reducing the effectiveness of the insurgent production
process. The British implemented programs that addressed both
aspects of the conversion process. Crop spraying by the Royal
Air Force (RAF) fell into the former category while the
government's rewards for surrender program addressed both,
a . Crop Spraying
By 1953, food control and food denial operations
were hurting the guerrillas' ability to operate. In response,
the MRLA started cultivating jungle gardens. As they were
detected the RAF began spraying these gardens with poison. If
spraying failed to destroy the garden, then troops were called
in to uproot the plants. This provides an excellent example of
the government targeting the production mechanism directly.
Such actions strike at the heart of the organization's
conversion process and serve to weaken it. Although not used
in the Malayan case, attacks on other conversion mechanisms,
32
for example, training facilities, would also disrupt the
organization.
b. Psychological Operations
The psychological warfare campaign was intended to
induce the guerrillas to surrender. To be successful, the
government had to overcome the two primary fears that
prevented many insurgents from surrendering: the fear of
disciplinary action, if discovered by their leaders, and the
fear of maltreatment by the government forces. MCP propaganda
emphasized the latter possibility.
The government overcame these impediments by
showing the guerrilla how to surrender and how they could reap
financial rewards in doing so. Leaflet drops and voice
aircraft were used to communicate messages from members of
local units who had surrendered, telling the guerrillas they
were wasting their lives and calling on specific individuals
to give themselves up. (O'Ballance, p. 134)
The centerpiece of the government's psychological
campaign was the "rewards for surrender" program. Rewards were
given to insurgents who surrendered, to those who brought them
in (dead or alive) or for information which led to the capture
or killing of a guerrilla. Rewards ranged from US $28,000.00
for the chairman of the Central Committee of the MCP down to
US $875.00 for an ordinary soldier (Komer, p. 73) . The program
began slowly, but once the first guerrillas came in and word
of their surrender spread, the number of surrendered
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increased. In 1949, a total of 251 insurgents surrendered. In
1953, the program hit a high with 372. By the end of the war,
a total of 2,702 insurgents had surrendered (Komer, p. 74).
The impact on the guerrillas was indisputable. The
MCP made it a capital offense to even pick up a government
surrender leaflet. The possibility of treachery by a former
comrade began to spread mistrust among the insurgent ranks. It
also led to a degradation in the efficiency of the guerrilla
organization as "...the high command went to extraordinary
lengths to maintain control over their followers. Checks,
controls and inquisition multiplied; sentries watched
sentries; watchers watched everyone. It will never be possible
to calculate the loss of productivity which followed." (Komer,
p. 75) In addition, these attempts to maintain control, and
the occasional execution of a guerrilla eroded peoples'
confidence in the insurgents' cause.
It was especially valuable to attract defectors
from the leadership ranks of the insurgency, since these
individuals tended to have a greater impact on the
organization than the rank and file. If a local leader could
be captured or induced to surrender, this often meant that his
unit would collapse as an effective fighting force. Moreover,
the demise of such a leader also caused villagers to conclude
that the government was the winning side and they would
provide additional information on the Min Yuen or guerrilla
units operating in the area. By attacking the leaders, the
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British were able to degrade the insurgency's command and
control, and thus weaken one of the "critical nodes" of the
conversion process.
Thus, the propaganda campaign against the
guerrillas served to divert resources and impair the insurgent
organization's productivity. In doing so, it made them
vulnerable to attack.
3 . Hardening the Government
A government hardens itself by increasing its capacity
to absorb insurgent outputs. The creation of the New Villages
and expansion of the Home Guard provided the population and
the local government with the physical security needed to
repel attacks by the MRLA. The New Villages were surrounded by
high fences and their perimeters were lighted at night. Access
was strictly controlled, and everyone was subject to search.
The New Villages also provided a venue for economic
development. It moved the poorest segment of the population
into areas with roads, sewage, water, and electricity.
Schools, clinics, and other government services measurably
improved the standard of living for the contested population.
These settlements brought economic benefits as well as
security to the people's lives, and contributed to a
reorientation of thinking toward the government and away from
the MRLA.
Equally important were the Home Guard. The militia was
generally ineffective at first, due to the government's
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refusal to arm them properly. Many British officers were
apprehensive about arming the resettled Chinese, feeling that
any arms and ammunition supplied to them would simply be
handed over to the guerrillas. In an important decision, the
government decided to take the risk and arm the Home Guard
units with shotguns. The decision paid off. The loss of arms
was extremely limited, and by 1952 the Chinese Home Guard of
over 50,000 had units in nearly every new village. (Stubbs, p.
158) Most importantly, the Chinese community was impressed
that the government had the confidence in them to permit them
to arm. This action helped to unite the government and the
Chinese population against the insurgents.
4 . Attacking Insurgent Outputs
The final aspect of counterinsurgency is counterforce.
The British initially struggled finding the right kinds of
force to use against the MRLA. In the beginning of the war the
emphasis was on operating in conventional large-unit
formations. As Clutterbuck noted, "the predilection of some
army officers for major operations seems incurable." (Komer,
p. 50) The British recognized the need to shift to small-unit
operations, and by 1952 many units had made the change in
their tactics. However, the real success of counterforce
operations came when they were associated with and directly
supported the counterproduction strategy of food denial. These
operations involved the use of soldiers to cordon off a
selected area which was then subjected to food rationing, the
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central cooking of rice in community kitchens, and searches of
all villagers each time they left the village. Eventually,
after their food caches ran out, the guerrillas in the
cordoned area were forced to expose themselves as they tried
to obtain food from the village. Government patrols and
ambushes were then able to exact a heavy toll, and this in
turn convinced others to surrender in increasing numbers. "The
[guerrillas] citing hunger as their reason for surrendering
rose from none in 1949-1951 to 29 percent in January-February
1955." (Komer, p. 61) By 1953, these operations had proved to
be so successful that it was noted, "For the remaining years
of the Emergency, patrol, ambush... inspections, cordon, and
watch-and-ward activities associated with food denial became
the major occupations of the Security Forces." (Komer, 59)
In the end, the counterforce strategy that worked best
for the British was one that supported the primary thrust of
the COIN campaign, the attack on the inputs to the insurgent
system. An illustration of the systems model applied to Malaya
appears in Figure 2
.
B. SUCCESS IN MALAYA
The British counterinsurgent campaign in Malaya was



























































Figure 2. The Systems Model Applied to Malaya
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the guerrilla organization and the inputs on which that
infrastructure depended. By attacking the insurgency in this
way, the guerrilla was cut off from the support network which
provided him with the manpower for his units, the food,
medicine and shelter necessary for his safety. He was forced
to emerge from the safety of the jungle and fight the
government forces on their own ground, and it was there that
he was killed or captured. The government recognized that
insurgent forces, or outputs, were only a third of the
insurgent system. This recognition led to a strategy that
attacked all three components of the system, and this is what
ultimately accounted for the defeat of the insurgents.
We now turn to an examination of the war in El Salvador




III. THE WAR IN EL SALVADOR
In the early 1970s, chronic political, economic, and
social tensions generated the current crisis in El Salvador.
In the 1972 Presidential elections, the Christian Democratic
Party (PDC) candidate Jose Napoleon Duarte defeated the Army's
choice, Colonel Arturo Armando Molina, but the military
intervened on Molina's behalf and Duarte was beaten and
exiled. This overt subversion of the election process created
political turmoil. The legitimacy of the government eroded and
the deposed opposition elements became more radicalized and
confronted the government with violence. Focusing their
activities in urban areas, the rebels conducted a campaign of
civil disobedience, kidnapping for ransom, and political
assassination. Student, campesino, and labor organizations
began to collaborate with each other to topple the government
(Baloyra, 1982, p.l). The ruling elite and the military
responded with the use of death squads. As the military
government under Colonel Molina and his successor, General
Carlos Humberto Romero, became more repressive, support for
radical solutions grew. By 1979, the situation was "beyond
control by repression." (Manwaring and Prisk, 1988, p. 29)
The momentum of demonstrations, strikes, occupations, and
guerrilla attacks had brought the regime to the verge of
collapse. On October 15, 1979, reform-minded Salvadoran
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officers, mindful of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua
and fearful for the future of the army, launched a coup and
fashioned a new military-civilian junta. For the next several
months, the government was thrown into turmoil as juntas rose
and then collapsed, each unable to establish a viable
coalition or control the violence from the left or right. The
fourth junta, formed in January 1980, brought together the
military and the PDC in a tenuous alliance and initiated
reforms in banking, land, and commodities.
Meanwhile, insurgent cooperation and organization improved
with the unification of the five guerrilla factions under the
Farabundo Marti Liberation Movement (FMLN) . The five different
organizations-the Moscow-oriented Armed Forces of Liberation
(FAL) and Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) , the Socialist Armed
Forces of National Resistance (FARN) , the Maoist People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP) , and the Trotskyite Central American
Workers Revolutionary Party (PRTC)- united as a condition of
support by Fidel Castro (Manwaring and Prisk, p. 119). The
insurgents were encouraged by the chaos in the streets, the
success of the Sandinistas in neighboring Nicaragua, and the
government's problems in implementing reforms. Believing that
the people would rise up in mass support, the insurgents
launched the "final offensive" in January 1981, only to find
that they had overestimated their degree of popular support.




The failure of the final offensive forced the insurgent
leadership to reassess its strategy. Despite the setback, the
FMLN had the men, equipment, and external support to conduct
almost continuous military operations from 1981 to the end of
1984. Insurgent manpower reached its peak of 13,000 armed
combatants at this stage. The guerrillas moved from the cities
to the countryside and began to conduct major, conventional-
type attacks against strategic economic and military targets.
The FMLN held the initiative and operated freely in many parts
of the country. However, increased U.S. military assistance
resulted in the rapid expansion, equipping, and training of
the ESAF. Troop strength increased from 10,000 in 1979 to
approximately 56,000 by 1987 (Bacevich, 1988, p. 5). Benefiting
from U.S. arms, training, and a greater resource base than the
guerrillas, the military was able to turn the fighting around.
By 1985 the FMLN was forced to switch tactics and revert to a
strategy of protracted war, operate in smaller units and use
hit-and-run tactics often aimed at economic targets.
The military advances made by the ESAF were impressive.
The army markedly improved, particularly its ability to defend
cuarteles (ESAF military post) and strategic targets. With the
infusion of U.S. aid, the airforce provided airmobility to the
troops, as well as helicopter and fixed-wing gunship support
(Gruson, 1989). However, despite the ESAF's combat
superiority, the army has failed to extend government control
decisively into contested parts of the country. In 1991, the
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FMLN is operating with about 6,000 combatants and 50,000
active supporters (masas ) . It remains a powerful foe, capable
of massing for large and spectacular attacks. In addition, the
guerrillas act as the shadow government in at least a third of
the country. As a result the situation is deadlocked - a
stalemate within a protracted war.
A. APPLYING THE SYSTEMS MODEL
As was done in the previous case, we will now judge the
counterinsurgent military strategy of the ESAF using the
systems model of insurgency and counterinsurgency . This
analysis concludes that the ESAF properly implemented a
counterforce strategy during the 1981-1984 period when the
FMLN was fighting in a semi-conventional manner. However, when
the insurgents shifted tactics in 1985 and began to fight a
prolonged war, the ESAF failed to shift to a counterproduction
plan. The continuation of the counterforce strategy accounts
for the failure to defeat the insurgency. To be sure, there
were initiatives, often at the urging of the United States
aimed at counterproduction. However, an examination of these
efforts will show that these programs failed due to ESAF
neglect and preoccupation with the counterforce effort. The
result, after eleven years and 70,000 lives, is strategic
stalemate
.
1. An Output -Oriented Strategy
Unlike the British experience in Malaya, by the early
1980s the counterinsurgent forces in El Salvador were
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confronted with a quasi-conventional conflict. Following the
failure of the final offensive in 1981, the FMLN fell back
into the countryside and conducted semi -conventional attacks
on an increasingly beleaguered ESAF. Large FMLN units held the
initiative and operated freely in many parts of the country,
sometimes mounting attacks with as many as 600 men. Shortly
after his arrival in September 1983, Ambassador Thomas
Pickering noted:
a three month period with roughly 85 separate guerrilla
attacks of varying magnitudes but all significant to be
worth reporting. A large share of them were partially or
fully successful even from the Embassy's viewpoint. They
may have had a 60, 70, or 80 percent success rate in that
they did significant damage to army units caught off
guard, perhaps managed to kill or wound a large number of
government individuals, and were able to take over towns
for a period of time. (Manwaring and Prisk, p. 144)
Against this backdrop the United States implemented its plan
to expand, train, and equip the ESAF so that it could counter
the insurgents. 1 The ESAF was transformed from a weak
constabulary into a powerful army.
This new force was well suited to fight the large
combat engagements common during 1981-1984 when insurgent
strategy attempted to destroy the armed forces through large
unit action. The larger, more capable ESAF, freshly armed with
xThis Plan was guided by an in-depth survey of the
Salvadoran military conducted in the fall of 1981. Known as
the Woerner Report, (after General Fred Woerner, Ret.) the
plan outlined the force expansion, equipping, training, and
modernization of the Salvadoran Army, Air Force and Navy.
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M-16s, helicopter gunships, and artillery, was now able to
engage the insurgents in large unit actions and prevail.
TABLE 1. ESAF FORCE STRUCTURE (Bacevich, p. 5)
ESAF FORCE STRUCTURE




10.000 17.000 20.000 24.000 37.000 40.000 44.000 50.000 56.000
Maneuver
Battalions 13 16 17 22 43 40 41 42 41
Fixed Wing
Aircraft 28 28 22 21 25 38 42 49 63
Helicopters 5 5 13 17 28 32 47 67 72
Surface
Naval Units 4 4 4 10 12 13 20 21 33
By 1985 the ESAF had averted defeat and forced the FMLN to
revert to a strategy of protracted war, breaking down into
smaller units. What developed within the ESAF was a military
strategy which focused exclusively on outputs, or as one
participant/analyst calls, "a strategy founded on combat
firepower and maneuver." (Sheehan, 1989, p. 140) The ESAF was
transformed into a conventional army, complete with artillery
units and large immediate reaction battalions (BIRI). As
Sheehan recalls:
the BIRIs provided a great deal of firepower, flexibility,
and mobility ideal for amassing decisive combat power on
the conventional battlefield. For this purpose the
strategy worked between 1982 and 1985. The direct military
threat of the FMLN was greatly reduced. (Sheehan, p. 141)
Thus, for the semi-conventional phase of the war, the ESAF's
output-oriented strategy was the appropriate one. The army was
engaged in a fight for its life against a guerrilla force that
had reached semi-conventional operations. To confront this foe
the ESAF operated as a conventional army and eventually proved
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its superiority on the battlefield. But by 1985 the complexion
of the war had changed. No longer fighting a semi -conventional
force, the army now had to confront an enemy that reverted
back to phase two insurgency. The FMLN sought refuge among the
population, redoubled its efforts to build up the masas , and
adapted its tactics by breaking its attack columns into small,
twenty person groups that stayed highly foot mobile and
assembled quickly for offensive column strikes. Because the
insurgent strategy had changed, the counterforce strategy was
no longer appropriate. To properly adapt to the new insurgent
strategy, the ESAF should have modified its own plan, shifting
from a conventional emphasis of targeting enemy forces to a
counterinsurgent focus on controlling inputs and attacking
FMLN subversion. This did not occur. Instead, the ESAF
retained its conventional mindset, using its beefed up
airforce and airmobile tactics to try to find and fix
guerrilla units. The heavy reliance on airmobility when
confronting an insurgency is especially curious after that
strategy failed for the ESAF's sponsors (the United States)
some twenty years earlier in Vietnam. As Krepinevich recounts:
. . .while the airmobile forces [in Vietnam] were busy
searching for main-force units - they allowed the
guerrilla to achieve his purpose: infiltration into the
villages and subversion of the rural population.
(Krepinevich, p. 125)
Even when the army finally reoriented its forces to conduct
small unit operations, the primary emphasis remained fixed on
guerrilla forces. Thus, the force established between 1981 and
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1986 became largely irrelevant to the conduct of the insurgent
war. In the process of successfully avoiding a conventional
defeat, the ESAF transformed itself into an army that was and
remains incapable of winning at insurgency.
The Salvadoran military failed to adjust it strategy
and adequately commit to the counterproduction war. This weak
commitment resulted in the failure of those programs that did
seek to attack this subversion. The remainder of this chapter
will examine these programs and show how they failed due to
ESAF neglect and preoccupation with its conventional combat
strategy.
2. A Failure to Control Inputs and Attack Infrastructure
Compared to the Malayan case, the problem of isolating
the inputs to the insurgency in El Salvador is more complex.
Imposing a Malaya-like solution (attempting population and
food control via resettlement) in El Salvador is not a viable
option due to the high population density and the
prohibitively high fiscal costs associated with such a move
(Waghelstein, 1985, p. 14). The proper method to deny both
people and food to the insurgents in El Salvador is not
population control, but rather population protection. A
strategy of population protection does not require the massive
dislocation and costs associated with resettlement. It is
relatively cheap to implement. Yet if executed correctly, it
denies the insurgent contact with the people. The COIN
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Civil defense is not a new concept. As shown in
the previous case, the Home Guard in Malaya played an
important role in the defeat of the Chinese insurgency. In
Vietnam, the short-lived civilian irregular defense groups
(CIDG) program enjoyed considerable success. According to
Krepinevich:
by the end of 1962 the CIDG political action program had
recovered and secured several hundred villages, some three
hundred thousand civilians, and several hundred square
miles of territory from the VC, utilizing some thirty
eight thousand armed civilian irregulars. These people
fought well. . . and had a record of almost unbroken success
against the VC . (Krepinevich, p. 71)
The critical requirement in creating a civil defense force is
to first establish at least nominal control over the
insurgents in the area using regular army troops. Because
civil defense forces are generally small and lightly armed,
they cannot withstand sustained engagements with guerrilla
regulars. Clear and hold operations must be conducted prior to
the establishment of civil defense forces.
As a COIN tactic, civil defense has two primary
objectives. It can be used to create static defense forces to
defend communities from insurgent attack, and it can operate
as a population control mechanism to deny civilian support to
the insurgents, cutting the guerrillas off from their
intelligence and logistics network. The first objective is
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accomplished by using civil defense as a local security force
to repel the insurgents and reduce their freedom of movement.
In this role, civil defense serves as a force multiplier,
increasing the size of the armed forces. The second purpose is
achieved by using civil defense as a population-control
mechanism to collect intelligence and regulate the movement of
civilians. This is the role that makes civil defense so
valuable against an insurgency. A competent civil defense
program serves as the counterinsurgent ' s eyes and ears.
Because the unit lives in the village and observes the daily
routine, it can closely monitor members of their town, collect
intelligence on suspicious activities, and control the
movement of food and merchandise. In this way, civil defense
attacks guerrilla inputs by establishing a barrier between the
population and the insurgents which cuts them off from their
main source of supplies and information. Moreover, through the
careful observation of the village's inhabitants, the civil
defense unit can identify the individuals who are part of the
insurgent infrastructure. Armed with this information, the
Security Forces can arrest these supporters, interrogate them,
and obtain information on the remaining cadre. Eventually,
this will result in the rolling up of the guerrilla
organization in that village.
In the Salvadoran context, an aggressive civil
defense program would provide the means to deny inputs and
attack the insurgent infrastructure. Unfortunately, the ESAF
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efforts in this regard must be considered a failure. The ESAF
has failed to devote the resources, interest, and energy to
make civil defense effective, despite considerable pressure by
the United States and one U.S. Military Group (USMILGP)
commander who described civil defense as "the one solution
that would save the program." (Bacevich, p. 40)
The creation of civil defense forces in El
Salvador was complicated by the existence of an earlier
militia-like organization known as the National Democratic
Organization (ORDEN)
. In the 1970s, ORDEN evolved into the
political rights' instrument of repression; it eventually
became a death squad aimed at suspected opponents of the
government. In the current conflict, this legacy has made some
people reluctant to participate in the program. (U.S. military
trainer, April 1991.)
Civil defense also suffered from organizational
difficulties. Initially under the control of territorial
services, it has undergone several reorganizations. Most
recently it was put under the joint supervision of both
territorial services and the ESAF. The territorial services
officer is responsible for outfitting the units, but the key
to their success is the brigade commanders who exercise
operational control over the units in their areas and come to
their aid with reinforcements if they are attacked. This
uncoordinated management has had predictable results, as a
recent analysis on civil military operations concludes:
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Clearly, there is no centralized control, and what
training that has been received is minimal. Moreover,
there is little, if any, connection with regular forces,
self help projects, and national planning. As examples,
civil defense unit commanders are supposed to be able to
contact regular units by radio, but these forces may be as
far as 100 km away. There appears to be no national
planning applied down to the civil defense units. What is
done is apparently ad hoc ... (SWORD, Feb. 1988, p. 16) 2
The overwhelming impediment to successful implementation,
however, was the ESAF itself. The army never endowed civil
defense with a position alongside the other major directorates
in the EMC (ESAF high command) . Excluded from membership and
thus lacking prestige and authority, the civil defense program
could not command the respect and attention of the field
officers whose job it was to make it work. Moreover, civil
defense was viewed as a waste of time by many brigade
commanders who would rather be killing guerrillas, or as a
"gringo" imposed program, one of the prices of continued U.S.
aid. Many openly disliked the program, feeling that the need
to arm "civilians" somehow stains the honor of the army.
Others felt it represented an easy source of weapons for the
insurgents. These attitudes have doomed the civil defense
program to failure. (U.S. Military advisor, April 1991)
2See also: Ana Montes, Guatemala and El Salvador: Civil
Defense as a Counterinsurqencv Tactic (U) , Defense
Intelligence Agency, West Europe/Latin America Division,
Directorate of Research, November 1987 (SNF) ; and Charles L.
Armstrong (Lt Col) , "Combined Action Program: Variations in El
Salvador, " Marine Corp Gazette, August 1990.
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Even if the program could achieve organizational
unity and the support of the ESAF, its effect would be limited
because it adopted too narrow a mission. Focusing on weapons
familiarization and other military skills, it neglected the
critical mission of intelligence collection and "gatekeeping"
for the village which would impede and eventually destroy
rebel covert activity. As a result, the insurgent
infrastructure continues to garner the necessary inputs to
fuel the insurgency. Observing the situation in 1988, a
USSOUTHCOM analysis concluded:
In the final analysis of a counterinsurgency campaign, the
proper measures of success are those that relate to
disruption or threat to the insurgent organization. In El
Salvador, the insurgent leadership and organization
remains relatively unchallenged. This component of the
countersubversion dimension cannot be classified as
anything but a failure. (SWORD, Feb. 1988, p. 22)
In sum, the ESAF has failed to use the best method
available to it to defend the population and attack the
insurgent system.
b. Refugees
Just as the army has failed to deny to the
guerrillas the population in the villages, it has also failed
to control or defend the people who have fled their villages
to escape the fighting. This has been true throughout the war.
Refugees are largely ignored or handled on an ad hoc basis by
civilian and military authorities with little or no control
over their movements or activities. Disregarded by the
government, many fled to displaced person camps inside El
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Salvador or to refugee camps in neighboring Honduras, where
they fell under the firm control of the FMLN. As a reporter
for the New York Times observed:
. . .the camps have taken on the character of a small, self-
contained states, ruled by "coordination committees" of
pro-guerrilla Salvadorans who wield almost absolute
authority over their fellow refugees. (Uhlig, 1989)
To the chagrin of the ESAF, these camps became a rear area for
the insurgents, providing recruits, a rest and relaxation
center and a staging area for operations into Chalatenango and
Morazan departments. The ESAF failure to handle refugees has
returned to haunt them. In accordance with the 1987 regional
peace plan which called for each signatory to facilitate the
repatriation of refugees, the government has recently
permitted the return of about 16,000 refugees from their camps
along the Honduran-Salvadoran border. Through control of the
refugee leadership and other groups, the FMLN manipulated the
resettlement issue to put restraints on the ESAF, which is
prohibited from entering the camps or even operating near
them. The ESAF now sees the importance of refugees to the
insurgents, but it is too late. Today, these refugee
populations serve the same functions inside El Salvador as
they did in Honduras, as guerrilla base camps, staging areas,
and recruitment centers.
c. External Support
Internal sources of inputs are not the only
problem for the ESAF. They have also failed to control the
considerable external support the FMLN has enjoyed since the
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beginning of the conflict. Through a sophisticated logistics
network supported by the Sandinistas and Cubans, the FMLN
received overseas training, medical and communications
support, and tons of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. War
material from Cuba and Nicaragua has arrived for over ten
years via overland routes across Honduras (in trucks and
cars) , seaborne deliveries to the southeastern coast (canoes
or fishing vessels) , and light aircraft drops to any one of
the many airfields used by crop dusters in Usulutan, San
Miguel, or La Union departments. (Salvadoran officers, 1989)
Long a point of contention between opponents and supporters of
U.S. policy in El Salvador, massive external support to the
FMLN can no longer be disputed. The refit of most of the
insurgent combatants with AK-47 assault rifles (a weapon not
in the ESAF inventory) , the 25 November 1989 crash of a small
plane from Nicaragua carrying 24 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles,
and the 19 October 1989 Honduran seizure of a truck traveling
from Nicaragua bound for El Salvador with arms, ammunition,
and FMLN propaganda hidden in fake walls all point to an
extensive covert logistics network which has supported the
insurgency. 3 The total percentage of war material received
from external sources is unknown, but some analysts have put
the figure as high as eighty percent (SWORD, p. 7). Despite
3See Lawrence J. Whelan, "Weapons of the FMLN, " Institute
for Research on Small Arms in International Security , v. I,
pp. 1-6, August 1990; and Lindsey Gruson, "Plane in Salvador
with Soviet Arms Crashes and 4 Die," The New York Times , I:
1:3, 2 6 November 1989.
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the FMLN's heavy reliance on this support, the effort to
impede and interdict it has never been a priority for the
ESAF . This is evident in the inadequate funding and poor
skills of the two services charged with countering the
external support, the navy and the aduana (customs service).
Among its other responsibilities, the aduana is
charged with inspecting all vehicles at border crossing points
along the frontier with Honduras and Guatemala. Since the
smuggling of war material in hidden compartments aboard cars
and trucks is well known to the government, a thorough
inspection effort to halt or impede these shipments would be
expected. This is not case. Instead, the aduana '
s
attempts to
inspect vehicles and seize war material bound for the
insurgents are ineffective. Trucks and cars alike are often
waved through the checkpoints with only the most superficial
inspections. As one U.S. trainer who made a survey of several
such border crossing points reported, huge tractor-trailer
rigs with refrigerated trailers were not checked at all
because the inspectors did not have the proper cold weather
clothing necessary to enter the trailers to search them (U.S.
Military trainer, April 1991) . Although not documented,
corruption and intimidation by the insurgents also degrades
unit performance. But the problems at these checkpoints are
not overwhelming. In fact, they could easily be remedied with
training and modest expenditures if the government was
interested in doing so.
56
The other service associated with the interdiction
mission is the El Salvadoran Navy (ESN) . It is the smallest,
least supported, and least influential component of the
Salvadoran armed forces. Responsible for coastal patrol and
interdiction, the ESN has about 20 boats capable of offshore
operations. However, due to poor leadership, maintenance
problems, and an extreme shortage of trained personnel, only
a small number of boats are on patrol off the coast at any one
time. Moreover, the operational and tactical practices of the
navy are generally very poor. For example, boats anchor or
drift at night, there is poor light and noise discipline, poor
board and search procedures, and little or no training while
underway. As a result, the navy has not been able to interdict
one major arms shipment, and the southeastern coast is




Thus, the attack on inputs derived from external
sources has never been seriously addressed by the ESAF. This
support has been critical to the success and resilience of the
FMLN throughout the war. The failure to address it is
inexplicable, the consequences can be succinctly stated, "The
[insurgent] may win without external support; the [government]
is unlikely to win if he continues to receive it." (Leites and
Wolf, p. 24)
4These observations were made between February 1989 and




Unlike the Briggs Plan in Malaya, which defeated
the insurgents by attacking the communist organization in the
populated areas, the strategy of maneuver has failed to
isolate the insurgents from the population so that the
infrastructure could be identified and attacked. The
infrastructure remains intact and functioning. This is why the
ESAF, which can go "anywhere they want to in the country" has
not been able to defeat the insurgency. As a U.S. Defense
Attache explains:
The initiative consists of and is obtained only at such
time as the military and security forces are successfully
able to protect elected officials (they never were) and
prevent interdiction of traffic (they never were) . Prevent
the guerrillas from coming in at night to various
communities and propagandizing people or collecting war
taxes or policing up young people for service with the
guerrillas. The guerrillas were always able, right up to
the time I left, to require people to grow cotton or to
grow coffee. The guerrillas were determining the wage
structure for the workers. The guerrillas were collecting
a certain amount of money for every hectare that was
planted... In other words, there was still a close
interaction. Even though the guerrillas were reduced in
numbers... they essentially had the same direct interface
with the population whenever the military wasn't there to
prevent it from happening. (Manwaring and Prisk, p. 345) 5
5Writing four years later in 1989, James LeMoyne of the
New York Times makes the same point, "The guerrillas are the
shadow government in a third of the country. In those areas,
they expel peasants who oppose them, but work hard to provide
security, schools, clinics and a sense of participation to
their supporters. They have developed an effective tax-
collection system, produce light weapons in their own
factories, and maintain an extensive communications and spy
network. So far, they have survived everything the army and
its American advisors have thrown at them. (LeMoyne, 1989,
p. 57.)
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Thus, as a result of the ESAF's neglect of programs aimed at
the insurgent infrastructure, the programs failed and the
guerrilla organization remains intact. The continued viability
of the FMLN's organization accounts for the stalemate.
3. The Conversion Process is Ignored
As discussed in Chapter 1, the conversion process of
an insurgency refers to the means of converting inputs into
guerrilla forces and activities. The government needs to know
how this organization operates if it is to destroy it. It is
up to the intelligence services to pull the screen of secrecy
away from the insurgency so that the COIN forces can attack
it. In order to do this, the government must direct its
intelligence organization correctly. Traditional intelligence
collection on enemy order of battle (OB) (combat units,
armament, location) is important, but of much greater
importance is to acquire intelligence on the insurgent
infrastructure. Intelligence must direct its information
gathering efforts primarily on the infrastructure, not enemy
troops. The opponent's infrastructure is the foundation of
insurgency warfare. As Sir Robert Thompson noted, "if the
intelligence organization is targeted on the infrastructure,
it will get the order of battle as well, but if it is targeted
on the order of battle, it will not get the infrastructure."
(Thompson, 1969, p. 166) Intelligence on the infrastructure
allows COIN forces to root it out. Successfully attacking the
insurgent leadership and organization results in the
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elimination of centralized direction and control,
fragmentation of the organizational infrastructure, and the
ultimate destruction of the entire organization (SWORD, p.
22). The principle means of obtaining information on the
insurgent organization is through human intelligence (HUMINT)
[The development of agent networks and the interrogation of
captured or surrendered personnel] . HUMINT provides the
specific, detailed kind of information necessary to fracture
the security of the subversive network so it can be attacked.
Like the operational forces, the Salvadoran
intelligence organization is output-oriented. It has focused
on the conventional OB designed to support counterforce
operations and has failed to address the insurgent
organization. In so doing, it addressed only the manifestation
of the insurgency and overlooked its heart-- the leadership
and guerrilla organization.
There are different reasons that account for the
misdirection of the intelligence apparatus. The first is the
natural tendency for conventional armies to focus on OB.
Because ESAF commanders retain a conventional mindset, and the
intelligence function is to support the operational commander,
intelligence has stressed support to counterforce operations.
This misplaced emphasis on OB intelligence was fueled by the
U.S. application of a variety of sophisticated intelligence
platforms designed to support its own forces in mid and high
intensity conflicts. These platforms did exactly what they
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were designed to do, producing information on enemy forces.
(Manwaring and Prisk, pp. 310-316) What they did not and could
not do is reveal the insurgent infrastructure operating in the
cantones and caserios (small villages) . Moreover, ESAF
reliance on such technical systems began to foster a garrison
mentality about intelligence collection. Salvadoran officers
developed a belief that they did not have to go outside the
cuartel to obtain intelligence on the enemy. They believed
reports would come to them- -prepackaged as intercepts and
photographs. This mindset among ESAF officers seriously
retarded the aggressive pursuit of HUMINT programs and the
people-to-people contact that is indispensable when
confronting an insurgency (U.S. Intelligence trainers, April
1991)
.
6 ESAF efforts to attack the infrastructure continue
to be weak, despite a growing appreciation for the importance
of HUMINT.
Because the intelligence effort has not focused on the
insurgent organization, a complete understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of the FMLN is lacking. This, in
turn, has weakened the psychological operations campaign,
which depends heavily on the full details of the insurgent
infrastructure to discredit and neutralize the guerrilla
leadership and organization.
6 Several U.S. trainers commented that the Salvadorans
seemed to be "always waiting for the one intercept or
interrogation report whose implications would be self evident,
thereby reducing the need for analysis."
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a. Psychological Operations
Psychological operations (psyops) aimed at the
insurgent infrastructure are meant to reduce moral, increase
internal conflicts, and discredit the organization. ESAF
psychological operations have had mixed success at achieving
these goals. At the strategic level, President Duarte's and
Cristiani's tours of the United States and Western Europe have
positively influenced heads of state, but the governments'
overall effort to counter FMLN propaganda abroad has been
weak. Likewise, at the tactical level, a recent money for arms
campaign ( Plan Puente ) , the armed forces radio station (Radio
Cuscatlan ) , and a public relations effort against the
guerrilla mine campaign have all yielded positive results.
Despite these successes, the overall psychological operations
effort, like the war itself, is stalemated. A recent study on
psychological operations concludes, "Psyop is personality
dependent and consists of individual, ad hoc, piecemeal, and
uncoordinated efforts of four or five major players." (SWORD,
Psychological Operations Assessment 4 Feb 1988, p. 4)
The final component in attacking the conversion
process is the campaign against the guerrilla leadership. As
Leites and Wolf suggest, it is generally more difficult for
the insurgents to replace the high leadership than it is the
rank-and-file, and therefore they represent a high value
target to the government. In addition, to many people, the top
leadership represents the insurgency's soul or center of
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gravity. The elimination of such an important element could be
the decisive act that shows them the insurgency is no longer
a viable option. As a USMILGP commander explains:
If we kill Villalobos or if we kill Shafik Handal or if we
kill Leonel, they will be replaced-but they won't really
be replaced. Villalobos has been out there since 1971 or
1972, and Shafik before him. They are, in many people's
eyes, the revolution, if you will. The FMLN would have a
very, very difficult time replacing them if they were
gone. (Manwaring and Prisk, p. 435)
Despite the clear importance of this critical
node, the ESAF has not made the targeting of the insurgent
leadership a priority. The existence of specialized unit like
the Patrulla de Reconocimiento de Alcance Largo (PRAL)
suggests that the army has the unique weapons and training
necessary to infiltrate guerrilla secure areas to capture or
kill leaders. But they have either not exercised this
capability or they have tried and failed. According to the
same MILGP commander:
to my knowledge, we haven't done a very good job of going
after them [insurgent leaders]. To wit, I said, "I want
pictures of those guys. I want to see who those people are
that we are going after." I couldn't get those pictures
from the Estado Mayor . I had to go to the U.S.
intelligence community... Well if that is the case, its
hard to argue that we really are targeting those guys or
focusing against them to any extent. (Manwaring and Prisk,
p. 435)
4 . Attempts to Harden the Government Go Soft
Just as the ESAF failed to attack the conversion
process, it also neglected to give adequate attention to
hardening itself against insurgent activity. As we have seen,
the elements of a successful strategy for counterinsurgency
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involve concentrating enough force to destroy or expel the
main body of guerrillas so that the government can take
control of the population, win its willing support, and
eliminate the insurgent infrastructure. Some counterinsurgency
planners understood this, and over the years three programs
evolved. The National Campaign Plan (NCP) , United to
Reconstruct (UPR) and most recently Municipalities in Action
(MIA) all sought to break the link between insurgent and the
population. The hope was that sympathy for the guerrillas
would evaporate as the government demonstrated its ability to
protect the people and improve services. In the words of
Leites and Wolf, the government must show a "demonstrated
ability to complete announced programs, thereby certifying
that it should govern because it is governing." (p. 37) But
the ESAF did not deliver the fundamental requirement for these
programs to succeed—basic security to the population.
Security is defined as a populated geographic area where the
insurgent organization is incapable of establishing support
among the populace (Thornton, 1989, p. 10). The ongoing MIA
program shows promise, largely due to direct funding to local
authority, rather then through central government
institutions. But this program also lacks an ESAF commitment
to security. As NCP and UPR showed, efforts to improve the
standard of living are irrelevant unless they also reduce the
peoples' sense of insecurity.
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The first attempt to harden the government was the
National Campaign Plan, initiated in San Vicente department in
June 1983 under the name Operation MAQUILISHUAT . According to
Bacevich:
Focusing the attention of both the government and the
armed forces on the single department of San Vicente, the
concept of MAQUILISHUAT was an attractive one. A greatly
improved troop presence, with battalions staying in the
field rather than in the cuartel (ESAF military post)
,
would saturate the department, clearing it of major FMLN
concentrations. Behind this shield, a major combined
civilian-military effort would recruit civil defense
detachments, organize peasant cooperatives, reopen schools
and medical clinics, restore local government, and conduct
extensive civic-action projects. For its first hundred
days, this ambitious project lived up to its promise. The
Salvadorans made real headway; they seemed to have broken
the code. Unfortunately, neither the armed forces nor the
government could sustain the operation.
By the fall of 1983, the extra battalions moved on and
the government began promising other departments,
particularly Usulutan, a share of improved services,
thereby diluting the campaign's overall impact. The result
was predictable: The guerrillas returned to San Vicente
and obliterated MAQUILISHUAT' s achievements. They overran
civil defense outposts, forced the closure of schools and
clinics, subverted the cooperatives, and chased officials
loyal to GOES [Government of El Salvador] back to the
safety of San Salvador, (p.44) 7
Thus, the army's inability to secure the countryside condemned
the civic action to failure. The government tried again in
1986 with United to Reconstruct. Unlike the civilian run NCP,
this plan was controlled by the ESAF and instituted in each of
the 14 departments. It too failed, largely due to the
7For an examination of the National Campaign Plan and the
U.S. Counterinsurgency strategy behind it, see Victor Manuel
Rosello, Jr., An Assessment of the National Campaign Plan for
El Salvador: Planning for Success or Failure? Master's Thesis,
University of Chicago, March 1984.
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unwillingness of brigade commanders to commit men and
resources to the program and because the establishment of a
UPR zone in every department made it virtually impossible to
attain the necessary level of troop superiority (Austin and
others, 1988, p. 9)
.
These programs failed because the ESAF did not have
the strength both to maintain security indefinitely in the
target area and maintain their output-oriented approach. Even
if the army was able to hold one area, the ESAF strategy could
not provide the additional strength to replicate a success in
other areas. Here we see the ramifications of adopting the
wrong COIN strategy. Had the army fully supported the tactics
of counterproduction, such as the creation of civil defense
units, they could provide security to the project areas and
have sufficient forces to respond to insurgent activities.
Because they did not, efforts to gain the people's support and
increase government control over them failed.
B. ACCOUNTING FOR FAILURE
The conflict is El Salvador has reached a stalemate. The
principal reason for this stalemate is the ESAF's failure to
change its battleplan from a counterforce to a
counterproduction strategy when the insurgents reverted to
prolonged war in 1985. Attempts were made to confront the
subversion, but they have all failed due to ESAF neglect and
preoccupation with its ineffective plan. The result is an army
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that "can go anywhere it wants to" but cannot control the
country due to a largely untouched guerrilla infrastructure.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
Why did the counterinsurgent forces win in Malaya, and why
are they stalemated in El Salvador? The answer lies in what
they did.
In Malaya, the British campaign focused on denying inputs
to the insurgent system and attacking the infrastructure. They
did this through a resettlement program and food control
measures. The efficiency of the insurgent organization was
reduced through rewards for surrender and psychological
campaigns, and the government was hardened through a tailored
economic development program and the creation of the Home
Guards. As we have seen, this is precisely the counsel of the
systems model of counterinsurgency . The systems model suggests
that waging successful counterinsurgency requires that primary
attention be devoted to a counterproduction effort (denying
inputs and attacking the organization) rather than a
counterforce effort (attacking outputs) . The tactics used by
the British fit the prescriptions of the systems, and this
approach can account for the success in Malaya.
The Salvadoran experience was much different. The ESAF has
thus far failed to defeat the FMLN because they have not
adopted the appropriate COIN strategy. The army's campaign was
primarily one of employing counterforce to insurgent outputs.
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This focus on insurgent forces was the appropriate approach
during the 1981-1984 period when the war was in a semi-
conventional phase. During this period, the ESAF required a
force structure and strategy that allowed them to confront
large guerrilla units that posed a direct military threat to
the army and government. By 1985, however, the FMLN had lost
the capability to militarily defeat the ESAF and changed its
strategy, returning to revolutionary guerrilla warfare. This
style of fighting depends heavily on the structures through
which the movement's supporters in the population can be
mobilized to assist in the insurgent effort. This
infrastructure provides the manpower pool required to replace
guerrilla losses, critical logistics support to the guerrilla
fighters, advance information on army force movements, and
concealment when the insurgent forces need to disperse
rapidly. In the face of the FMLN's strategic shift, the ESAF
did not modify its own strategy to attack this structure,
which is the approach advocated by the systems model. Instead,
it continued to emphasize insurgent outputs. In doing so it
missed the infrastructure and addressed only the
manifestations of the insurgency, rather than the insurgency's
capacity to reproduce. The ESAF strategy was condemned to
fight the insurgency at the margin, chasing and sometimes
catching small guerrilla units, or killing others in the
process of beating back an attack on a cuartel or economic
69
target. The failure to adopt the correct COIN strategy
accounts, in large measure, for the ESAF's failure to defeat
the insurgency.
The ESAF counterforce strategy was manifest in two ways.
First, it was marked by the continued emphasis on the highly
mobile and heavily armed BIRIs, the smaller anti-terrorist
battalions (BIAT) , and the offensive punch of the gunships and
attack planes of the airforce. The BIRIs operate as reaction
forces, augmenting forces in an area or operating
independently of the department's brigade commander. When the
operation is completed they move to another troublespot or
target, often in another part of the country. These units
rarely remain in an area long enough to develop the HUMINT
nets necessary to penetrate the insurgent organization. The
same is true of the BIATs, which make up the majority of the
ESAF units. These units are rotated to different areas within
their brigade's area of operations every thirty days,
preventing the development of information on the guerrilla
infrastructure. The counterforce strategy resulted in an army
that was organized and operated in a way that did not allow
for a COIN effort against inputs or infrastructure.
The fixation on insurgent outputs is further revealed in
the poor support in terms of men, material, and command
attention that the ESAF and the Estado Mayor has given to
those programs that have attempted to deny inputs and target
the organization. Attempts to deny the insurgents key inputs,
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such as refugees and foreign material support, were never made
a priority by the ESAF. This was and still is apparent by the
weaknesses and lack of attention the aduana and navy receive.
Similarly, the crucial task of defending the population and
attacking the insurgent infrastructure was bungled because the
ESAF never accepted the civil defense program as their own.
Psychological operations targeted against the insurgents were
ad hoc, the little effort that has been devoted to such
operations has been made at the brigade level. There is no
capacity at all to carry out psyops at the individual
battalion level, exactly the place where the war was and is
being fought
.
The result of these failings are clear: the insurgent
organization remains intact and capable of regenerating new
forces faster than the ESAF has been able to kill them. The
failure to follow the prescriptions of the systems model
accounts for the stalemated prolonged war in El Salvador.
B. FACTORS PREVENTING ESAF'S USE OF THE MODEL
Having attributed ESAF failure to the wrong COIN strategy,
let us examine some possible reasons why the right strategy
was not adopted. Possible explanations will be divided into
two categories: the first drawn from conditions internal to
the ESAF, the second from conditions external to the army.
1 . Internal Factors
The first factor relates to the tradition of the
Salvadoran army. Historically, the El Salvadoran army has been
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"conventionally minded, " oriented to protect the national
territory from foreign rather than internal attack. The 1969
Soccer War with Honduras was fought in a conventional manner
and reinforced this mindset . Despite the counterinsurgency
training received from U.S. schools in Panama since the late
1950's, the lessons did not "take" (Waghelstein, p. 35). As
Waghelstein observed:
. . .the inculcation of counterinsurgency as the most likely
form of warfare simply did not occur. This army, with few
exceptions, had no experience in... the type of war in
which the civilian population... was the objective. When
asked why, after more than two decades of exposure to
counterinsurgency techniques, there was still so much
resistance to implementing them, the responses were
invariably, "We never thought it could happen here, " and
"The only war our leaders ever fought was the conventional
one with Honduras." (Waghelstein, p. 35-36)
This conventional mindset has arguably prevented Salvadoran
officers from seeing the insurgency as a different kind of
threat, one that required a different kind of strategy. The
ESAF leadership, drawing from their experience in Honduras,
believed that the FMLN posed a related conventional problem.
Their conventional frame of reference, in short, prevented
them from seeing the importance of attacking the whole
organization, rather than just a part of it.
Another possible explanation for not approaching the
insurgency as a challenge relates to the tanda system of
officer promotions. As each tanda (class) of officers is
graduated from the military academy, it is promoted together
through the ranks. An individual officer's performance or
initiative is largely irrelevant to his promotion, and his
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career is secure through the rank of colonel. Within a system
that guarantees promotions, one of the few ways that they
could be lost is through the advocacy or practice of what
would appear to be a high risk strategy. The systems model,
with its emphasis on counterproduction versus counterforce
targeting, troop dispersion, small unit tactics, etc. would
certainly appear to be a risky proposition to such officers.
All the more so given their strong conventional orientation.
The tanda system has arguably made the ESAF officer risk
adverse, and therefore unwilling to advocate or practice a
counterinsurgent strategy which "never took" with their
superiors
.
2 . External Factors
One possible external impediment to the implementation
of a counterproduction strategy has do with the ESAF's past
record of human rights abuses and the delicate dynamic of U.S.
aid. The systems model advocates an attack on the covert
infrastructure which supports the guerrilla combatant with
food, war material, and information. In many instances, this
infrastructure is made up of "civilians" who, although they
are active participants in the effort to overthrow the
government, may not be armed in the process of carrying out
their appointed duties. A COIN campaign which targets this
structure must be careful to operate in accordance with the
rule of law. A COIN force employing the systems model must be
prepared to use discriminate force based on good intelligence.
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It cannot abuse it authority by beatings, torture, and murder
of suspected cadre and insurgent supporters. As Thompson
noted, "A government which does not act in accordance with the
law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot
then expect its people to obey the law." (Thompson, p. 52)
In El Salvador, the ESAF and the Security Forces have
a long history of acting outside the law. In the 1970s and
early eighties the armed forces and death squads associated
with them were responsible for thousands of deaths. The 16
November 1989 slaying of six Jesuit priests by elements of the
ESAF indicate this legacy is not fully behind them. Against
this history is balanced the political dynamic of U.S. aid to
El Salvador. The government depends heavily on this aid, which
over the last ten years has exceeded $4 billion (Krauss, p.l)
.
Security assistance to the Salvadoran government is a highly
divisive issue in the U.S. Congress which approves it. This,
coupled with a tightly orchestrated FMLN propaganda campaign
through an extensive network of FMLN support groups in the
United States makes any ESAF misstep a potential aid-stopper.
The political dynamic of continued U.S. aid is highly
dependent on ESAF good behavior. Without it, pressure to
suspend or cancel aid from the Congress, FMLN support groups,
and the international community would be intense. Should an
ESAF attempt to root out the insurgent infrastructure in an
FMLN-controlled refugee camp, for example, result in the death
of a civilian, the FMLN could well mobilize a public outcry in
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Washington. With emotions running high, congressmen who oppose
aid to the ESAF might, under these circumstances, succeed in
mobilizing the votes to end U.S. support. Given the political
realities of the bloody legacy of the ESAF and its dependence
on uncertain U.S. support, a strategy targeted against the
insurgent infrastructure may in fact appear untenable.
A final factor relates to U.S. assistance itself.
Security assistance to El Salvador arrives in the form of
weapons, military equipment, military trainers, and other
support designed to help the ESAF to defeat the FMLN. Ideally,
this assistance is appropriate to combating an insurgency, and
helps to create a COIN-minded army and military strategy.
Unfortunately, it appears the opposite is true. The "Colonel's
Report" found that "Despite the oft-expressed American intent
to convert the ESAF into a counterinsurgent force, U.S. policy
has failed to wean the Salvadorans from their conventional
mindset. If anything, American actions have reinforced that
bias." (Bacevich, p. 29) An analysis by a former military
trainer makes a similar point when he shows that only four of
the fifty-five U.S. military trainers assigned to El Salvador
during his tenure were designated for psychological, civil
defense or civic action operations. (Sheehan, p. 139) The
Salvadoran military may have failed to commit the necessary-
resources to the appropriate COIN strategy because their
American sponsors were not committed to it themselves.
75
Perhaps the best explanation is the combination of the
ESAF prediliction for conventional operations with the U.S.
tendency to encourage such behavior. Because the ESAF saw
itself as a conventional force, it wanted the hi technology
weaponry that its sponsor was willing to provide. The
acquisition of artillery, the demand for more and more
helicopters, and the eThe ESAF was not interedsted in a low
tech war, as advocated by the model, which requires the HUMINT
networks, careful analysis, and the tedious work of putting
together a "wiring diagram" of an insurgent organization. They
preferred to fly over the heads of the population in their
U.S. supplied helicopters rather than operater in the villages
where the insurgent infrastructure flourished.
What these points do suggest, however, is the true
complexity of any counterinsurgent campaign. The model offers
sound principles for the military component of a COIN
strategy. But future counterinsurgency planners and analysts
must be prepared to go beyond the model if necessary. They
must anticipate any external political problems that may
affect the prosecution of a counterinsurgency campaign and be
prepared to deal with them. This is a logical suggestion for
further research into the problem. Future analysts may wish to
examine and possibly broaden and better "operationalize" the
systems model of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and make it
an even more valuable tool to be used against future groups
threatening a government with internal war.
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